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ABSTRACT
Security attacks targeting smart contracts have been on the rise,
which have led to financial loss and erosion of trust. Therefore,
it is important to enable developers to discover security vulnera-
bilities in smart contracts before deployment. A number of static
analysis tools have been developed for finding security bugs in
smart contracts. However, despite the numerous bug-finding tools,
there is no systematic approach to evaluate the proposed tools
and gauge their effectiveness. This paper proposes SolidiFI, an au-
tomated and systematic approach for evaluating smart contracts’
static analysis tools. SolidiFI is based on injecting bugs (i.e., code
defects) into all potential locations in a smart contract to introduce
targeted security vulnerabilities. SolidiFI then checks the generated
buggy contract using the static analysis tools, and identifies the
bugs that the tools are unable to detect (false-negatives) along with
identifying the bugs reported as false-positives. SolidiFI is used to
evaluate six widely-used static analysis tools, namely, Oyente, Secu-
rify, Mythril, SmartCheck, Manticore and Slither, using a set of 50
contracts injected by 9369 distinct bugs. It finds several instances
of bugs that are not detected by the evaluated tools despite their
claims of being able to detect such bugs, and all the tools report
many false positives.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed a dramatic rise in the popularity
of smart contracts [Clack et al. 2016]. Smart contracts are small
programs written into blocks running on top of a blockchain that
can receive and execute transactions autonomously without trusted
third parties [Grishchenko et al. 2018]. Ethereum [Buterin 2014] is
the most popular framework for executing smart contracts.
Like all software, smart contracts may contain bugs. Unfortu-
nately, bugs in smart contracts can be exploited by malicious attack-
ers for financial gains. In addition, transactions on Ethereum are
immutable and cannot be reverted, so losses cannot be recovered.
Further, it is difficult to update a smart contract after its deployment.
Consequently, there have been many bugs in smart contracts that
have been maliciously exploited in the recent past [dao 2016; par
2017; Mathieu and Mathee 2017]. Therefore, there is a compelling
need to analyze smart contracts to detect and fix security bugs.
Several approaches and tools have been developed that statically
find security bugs in smart contracts [Feist et al. 2019; Luu et al. 2016;
Mueller 2018; Tikhomirov et al. 2018; Tsankov et al. 2018]. However,
despite the prevalence of these static analysis tools, security bugs
abound in smart contracts [Perez and Livshits 2019]. This calls into
question the efficacy of these tools and their associated techniques.
Unfortunately, many of the static analysis tools have been evaluated
either only by their developers on custom data-sets and inputs, often
in an ad-hoc manner, or on data-sets of contracts with a limited
number of bugs (112 bugs [Durieux et al. 2019] and 10 bugs [Parizi
et al. 2018]). To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic
method to evaluate static analysis tools for smart contracts regarding
their effectiveness in finding security bugs.
Typically, static analysis tools can have both false-positives and
false-negatives. While false positives are important, false negatives
in smart contracts can lead to critical consequences, as exploiting
bugs in contracts usually leads to loss of ether (money). Also, em-
pirical studies of software defects in the field have found that many
of the defects can be detected by static analysis tools in theory, but
are not detected due to limitations of the tools [Thung et al. 2012].
In our work, we focus mostly on the undetected bugs (i.e., false
negatives), though we also study false-positives of the tools.
We perform bug injection to evaluate the false-negatives of smart
contract static analysis tools. Bug injection as a testing approach
has been extensively explored in the domain of traditional programs
[Bonett et al. 2018; Dolan-Gavitt et al. 2016; Pewny and Holz 2016];
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however, there have been few papers on bug injection in the context
of smart contracts. This problem is challenging for two reasons.
First, smart contracts on Ethereum are written using the Solidity
language, which differs from conventional programming languages
typically targeted by mutation testing tools [Dannen 2017]. Second,
because our goal is to inject security bugs, the bugs injected should
lead to exploitable vulnerabilities.
This paper proposes SolidiFI1, a methodology for systematic eval-
uation of smart contracts’ static analysis tools to discover potential
flaws in the tools that lead to undetected security bugs. SolidiFI
injects bugs formulated as code snippets into all possible locations
into a smart contract’s source code written in Solidity. The code
snippets are vulnerable to specific security vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by an attacker. The resulting buggy smart contracts
are then analyzed using the static analysis tools being evaluated,
and the results are inspected for those injected bugs that are not
detected by each tool - these are the false-negatives of the tool.
Because our methodology is agnostic of the tool being evaluated, it
can be applied to any static analysis tool that works on Solidity.
We make the following contributions in this paper.
• Design a systematic approach for evaluating false-negatives
and false-positives of smart contracts’ static analysis tools.
• Implement our approach as an automated tool, SolidiFI, to
inject security bugs into smart contracts written in Solidity.
• Use SolidiFI to evaluate six static analysis tools of Ethereum
smart contracts for false-negatives and false-positives.
• Provide an analysis of the undetected security bugs and
false-positives for the 6 tools, and the reasons behind them.
The results of using SolidiFI on 50 contracts show that all of
the evaluated tools had significant false-negatives ranging from
129 to 4137 undetected bugs across 7 different bug types despite
their claims of being able to detect such bugs, as well as many
false positives. Further, many of the undetected bugs were found
to be exploitable when the contract is executed on the blockchain.
Finally, we find that SolidiFI takes less than 1 minute to inject bugs
into a smart contract (on average). Our results can be used by
tool developers to enhance the evaluated tools, and by researchers
proposing new bug-finding tools for smart contracts.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Smart Contracts
As mentioned earlier, smart contracts are written in a high-level
language such as Solidity. They are compiled to Ethereum Vir-
tual Machine (EVM) bytecode that is deployed and stored in the
blockchain accounts. Smart contract transactions are executed by
miners, which are a network of mutually untrusted nodes, and
governed by the consensus protocol of the blockchain. Miners re-
ceive execution fees, called gas, for running the transactions which
are paid by the users who submit the execution requests. We illus-
trate smart contracts through a running example shown in Figure 1
(adapted from prior work [Atzei et al. 2017]).
This contract implements a public game that enables users to
play a game and submit their guesses or solutions for the game
along with some amount of money. The money will be transferred
1SolidiFI stands for Solidity Fault Injector, pronounced as Solidify.
1 pragma solidity >=0.4.21 <0.6.0;
2 contract EGame{
3 address payable private winner;
4 uint startTime;
5
6 constructor () public{
7 winner = msg.sender;
8 startTime = block.timestamp ;}
9
10 function play(bytes32 guess) public {
11 if(keccak256(abi.encode(guess)) == keccak256(abi.
encode('solution '))){
12 if (startTime + (5 * 1 days) == block.timestamp
){
13 winner = msg.sender ;}}}
14
15 function getReward () payable public{
16 winner.transfer(msg.value);}
17 }
Figure 1: Simple contract written in Solidity.
to the account of the last winner if the guess is wrong; otherwise the
user will be set as the current winner and will receive the money
from users who play later. The constructor() at line 6 runs only
once when the contract is created, and it sets the initial winner to
the owner of the contract defined by the user who submitted the
create transaction of the contract (msg.sender). It also initializes
the startTime variable to the current timestamp during the contract
creation. The function play at line 10 is called by the user who
wants to submit his/her guess, and it compares the received guess
with the true guess value. If the comparison is successful, it sets the
winner to the address of the user account who called this function,
provided the guess was submitted within 5 days of creating the
contract. Finally, the function getReward sends the amount of ether
specified in the call to getReward (msg.value), to the last winner.
2.2 Static Analysis Tools
We consider six static analysis tools for finding bugs in smart con-
tracts in this paper, Oyente, Securify, Mythril, Smartcheck, Man-
ticore, and Slither. They all operate on smart contracts written in
Solidity, and are freely available. Further, they are all automated
and require no annotations from the programmer. We selected
Oyente [Luu et al. 2016], Securify [Tsankov et al. 2018], Mythril
[Mueller 2018], and Manticore [Mossberg et al. 2019] as they were
used in many smart contract analysis studies [Brent et al. 2018;
Parizi et al. 2018; Perez and Livshits 2019; Tsankov et al. 2018]. We
included Smartcheck [Tikhomirov et al. 2018] as it uses a pattern
matching approach rather than symbolic execution employed by
the previous four tools. Similarly Slither [Feist et al. 2019] is another
non-symbolic-execution based tool, but unlike SmartCheck, it uses
Static Single Assignment (SSA) for analysis.
3 MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES
This section first presents motivating examples of undetected secu-
rity bugs by static analysis tools, followed by an overview of the
challenges in the evaluation of the tools.
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11 uint _vtime = block.timestamp;
12 if (startTime + (5 * 1 days) == _vtime){
Figure 2: Modification made to the contract in Figure 1
3.1 Motivating examples
The contract example in Figure 1 has at least 2 vulnerabilities,
(1) two instances of timestamp dependency bug at lines 8 and 12,
and (2) one instance of transaction ordering dependence (TOD)
represented by the transactions at lines 13 and 16. The timestamp
dependency bug is that the block’s timestamp should not be used
in the transaction, while the TOD bug is that the state of the smart
contract should not be relied upon by the developer (Section 7).
We have used four of the static analysis tools in Section 2 (sup-
posed to detect these bugs) to check this contract for bugs, Oyente,
Securify, Mythril, and SmartCheck. According to the tools’ re-
search papers [Luu et al. 2016; Mueller 2018; Tikhomirov et al.
2018; Tsankov et al. 2018], Oyente, Mythril and SmartCheck should
detect the timestamp dependency bug. However, we found that
while Oyente and Mythrill were not able to detect both instances of
timestamp dependency bug in lines 8 and 12, Smartcheck detected
only the instance in line 12. For the second instance, Smartcheck
gave a hint that block.timestamp should be “used only in equalities”.
To further test SmartCheck’s ability to detect the bug, we made a
small modification to the syntax of the smart contract while keep-
ing its semantics the same (Figure 2). SmartCheck subsequently
failed to detect the bug altogether.
Regarding the TOD bug, both Oyente and Securify are supposed
to detect this class of bugs. However, we found that only Securify
detected this bug successfully while Oyente was not able to detect it.
We extracted the code snippet representing TOD from this contract
(lines 10 to 16), injected it in another larger contract free of bugs,
and obtained similar results.
These examples motivated us to prepare multiple code snippets
for the different bugs (within the scope of the tools) and to manually
inject them into the code of 5 smart contracts (the first 5 contracts
in the set of contracts in Section 7). We then used the tools to check
the buggy contracts, and found several instances of undetected bugs
even though the tools were supposed to detect them. However, it
was tedious and error-prone to manually inject these bugs and
inspect the results, and so we decided to automate this process.
3.2 Automated bug injection challenges
The simplest way to inject bugs into smart contracts is to inject
them at random locations - this is how traditional fault injection
(i.e., mutation testing) works. However, random injection is not a
cost-effective approach as we have to follow specific guidelines for
the injected bug to be exploitable. We identify two main challenges.
3.2.1 Bug injection locations. As the underlying techniques used
by some tools (e.g., symbolic execution) depends on the control and
data flow in the analyzed contracts, injecting an instance of each
bug at a single location would not be sufficient. Therefore, bugs
should be injected into all potential locations in the contract code.
On the other hand, the process of identifying the potential locations
depends on the code of the original contract, and also on the type
and nature of each bug. Injecting bugs at the wrong locations would
result in compilation errors. In addition, it might yield instances of
dead code in the contract. For example, injecting a bug formulated
as a stand-alone function inside the body of another function would
result in a compilation error, as Solidity does not support nested
functions. Moreover, a bug injected into an ’if’ statement condition
that would make the condition always fail, would make the ’then’
clause unreachable.
3.2.2 Semantics dependency. For the injected bug to be an active
bug that can be exploited by an attacker, it has to be aligned with
the semantics of the original contract. For example, assume that we
want to inject a Denial of Service (DoS) bug by calling an external
contract. We can use an if-statement with a condition containing
a call to another contract function. However, for this bug to be
executed, we also need to define the appropriate external contract.
SolidiFI addresses the first challenge by parsing the Solidity lan-
guage into an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and injecting bugs into
all syntactically valid locations. It addresses the second challenge
by formulating exploitable code snippets for each bug type.
4 SOLIDIFI APPROACH ANDWORKFLOW
Themain goal of SolidiFI is to perform systematic evaluation of static
analysis tools used to check smart contracts for known security
bugs. Figure 3 shows the workflow of SolidiFI. The code snippets
representing a specific security bug are injected in each smart
contract’s source code at all possible locations (step 1). The selection
of the injection locations is a function of the bug to be injected.
SolidiFI injects bugs into the source code to imitate the introduction
of bugs by developers. However, its use is not restricted to tools that
perform analysis at the source code level. For example, tools that work
on the EVM bytecode would compile the buggy contracts to produce
the EVM code for analysis. Then, the injected code is scanned using
the static analysis tools (step 2). Finally, the results of each tool are
checked, and false negatives and false positives are measured (step
3).
Figure 3: SolidiFIWorkflow.
4.1 Bug Model
In our work, a security bug is expressed as a code snippet, which
leads to a vulnerability that the security tool being analyzed aims to
detect. SolidiFI reads code snippets to be injected from a pre-defined
bug pool prepared by us (the bug pool can be easily extended by
users to add new bugs). For each tool, we only inject the bugs
that the tool claims to detect. based on the tool’s research paper.
However, because the tools are continuously evolving, the research
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paper may not have the up-to-date list of bugs detected by the tool,
and hence we use the tool’s online documentation to augment it.
4.2 Bug Injection
In this work, the security bugs are injected in the source code in
three ways as follows.
4.2.1 Full code snippet. In this approach, we prepare several code
snippets for each bug under study. Each code snippet is a piece of
code that introduces the security bug. To illustrate the process, we
discuss the bugs and example code snippets.
Timestamp dependency. The current timestamp of the block
can be used by contracts to trigger some time-dependent events.
Given the decentralized nature of Ethereum, miners can change
the timestamp (to some extent). Malicious miners can use this
capability and change the timestamp to favor themselves. This
bug was exploited in the GoverMental Ponzi scheme attack [Eth
[n.d.]]. Therefore, developers should not rely on the precision of the
block’s timestamp. Figure 4 shows an example of a code snippet that
represents the bug (block.timestamp returns the block’s timestamp).
1 function bug_tmstmp () public returns(bool)
2 { return block.timestamp >= 1546300;}
Figure 4: Timestamp dependency examples.
Unhandled exceptions. In Ethereum, contracts can call each
other, and send ether to each other (e.g., send instruction, call in-
struction, etc.). If an exception is thrown by the callee contact (e.g.,
limited gas for execution), the contract is terminated, its state is
reverted, and false is returned to the caller contract. Therefore,
unchecked returned values within the caller contract could be used
to attack the contract, leading to undesired behavior. A serious
version of this bug occurred in the “King of the Ether" [Eth [n.d.]].
Figure 5 shows an example (the send() instruction requires its return
value to be checked for exceptions to make it secure).
1 function unhandledsend () public {
2 callee.send(5 ether);}
Figure 5: Unhandled exceptions examples.
Integer overflow/underflow. In Solidity, storing a value in
an integer variable bigger or smaller than its limits lead to integer
overflow or underflow. This can be used by attackers to fraudulently
siphon off funds. For example, Figure 6 shows an example code
snippet in which an attacker can reset the lockTime for a user by
calling the function incrLockTime and passing 256 as an argument -
this would cause an overflow, and end up setting the lockTime to 0.
Batch Transfer Overflow is a real-world example [PoW [n.d.]].
Use of tx.origin. In a chain of calls, when contracts call func-
tions of each other, the use of tx.origin (that returns the first caller
that originally sent the call) for authentication instead ofmsg.sender
(that returns the immediate caller) can lead to phishing-like attacks
[sol [n.d.]]. Figure 7 shows an example snippet in which tx.origin is
used to withdraw money.
1 function incrLockTime(uint _sec) public{
2 lockTime[msg.sender] += _sec;}
Figure 6: Integer overflow/underflow example.
1 function bug_txorigin(address _recipient) public {
2 require(tx.origin == owner);
3 _recipient.transfer(this.balance);}
Figure 7: tx.origin authentication example.
Re-entrancy. Contracts expose external calls in their interface.
These external calls can be hijacked by attackers to call a func-
tion within the contract itself several times, thereby performing
unexpected operations within the contract itself. For example, the
external call in Line 3 of the snippet code shown in Figure 8 can be
used by an attacker to call the bug_reEntrancy() function repeatedly,
potentially leading to withdrawal of ether more than the balance
of the user. The DAO attack [dao 2016] is a well-known example
exploiting this bug.
1 function bug_reEntrancy(uint256 _Amt) public {
2 require(balances[msg.sender] >= _Amt);
3 require(msg.sender.call.value(_Amt));
4 balances[msg.sender] -= _Amt;}
Figure 8: Re-entrancy example.
Unchecked send. Unauthorized Ether transfer, such as non
zero sends, can be called by external users if they are visible to
public, even if they do not have the correct credentials. This means
unauthorized users can call such functions and transfer ether from
the vulnerable contract [sol [n.d.]]. An example code snippet is
shown in Figure 9.
1 function bug_unchkSend () payable public{
2 msg.sender.transfer (1 ether);}
Figure 9: Unchecked send example.
Transaction Ordering Dependancy (TOD). Changing the or-
der of the transactions in a single block that has multiple calls to
the contract, results in changing the final output [Atzei et al. 2017].
Malicious miners can benefit from this. An example code snippet
vulnerable to this bug is shown in Figure 10. In this example, the
attackers can send a puzzle solving reward to themselves instead of
the winner of the game by executing bug_tod2() before bug_tod1().
4.2.2 Code transformation. This approach aims to transform a
piece of code without changing its functionality, but make it vul-
nerable to a specific bug. We leverage known patterns of vulnerable
code to inject this bug. We use this approach to inject two bug
classes that are compatible with this approach, namely (1) integer
overflow/underflow and (2) use of tx.origin.
Table 1 shows examples of the code patterns that are replaced to
introduce the bugs, and the vulnerable patterns for each bug type.
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1 address payable winner_tod;
2 function setWinner_tod () public {
3 winner_tod = msg.sender ;}
4 function getReward_tod () payable public{
5 winner_tod.transfer(msg.value);}
Figure 10: TOD example.
Table 1: Code transformation patterns.
Bug Type Original Code Patterns New Code Patterns
tx.origin msg.sender==owner tx.origin==owner
Overflow bytes32 bytes8
Overflow uint256 uint8
Figure 11 shows an example before and after bug injection us-
ing this approach. In this example, transfer instruction is used to
perform a transfer of the specified ether amount to the receiver’s
account after verifying the direct caller of sendto() to be the owner.
To inject the tx.origin bug, the authorization condition msg.sender
== owner should be replaced with the tx.origin == owner, in which
the owner is not the direct caller of sendto(). However, the autho-
rization check is passed successfully, which enables attackers to
authorize themselves, and send ether from the contract, even if they
are not the owner.
1 /*(Before)*/
2 function sendto(address receiver , uint amount) public
{
3 require (msg.sender == owner);
4 receiver.transfer(amount);}
5 /*(After injection)*/
6 function sendto(address receiver , uint amount) public {
7 require (tx.origin == owner);
8 receiver.transfer(amount);}
Figure 11: Code transformation example.
4.2.3 Weakening securitymechanisms. In this approach, weweaken
the security protection mechanisms in the smart contract code,
which protect external calls. Note that our goal is to evaluate the
static analysis tool, and not the smart contract itself. We use this
approach to inject Unhandled exception bugs. Figure 12 shows
an example, in which the Unhandled exceptions bug is injected by
removing the revert() statement that reverts the state of the con-
tract if the transfer transaction failed - this causes the balance to
incorrectly become 0 even if the transaction failed.
5 SOLIDIFI ALGORITHM
The process for injecting bugs takes as input the Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST) of the smart contract, and has the following steps.
(1) Identify the potential locations for injecting bugs and gener-
ate an annotated AST marking all identified locations.
(2) Inject bugs into all marked locations to generate the buggy
contract.
1 /*(Before)*/
2 function withdrawBal () public{
3 Balances[msg.sender] = 0;
4 if(!msg.sender.send(Balances[msg.sender ]))
5 { revert (); }}
6 /*(After injection)*/
7 function withdrawBal () public{
8 Balances[msg.sender] = 0;
9 if(!msg.sender.send(Balances[msg.sender ]))
10 { // revert ();
11 }}
Figure 12: Weakening security example.
(3) Check the buggy contract using the evaluated tools and
inspect the results for undetected bugs and false alarms.
We discuss the steps in detail below.
Bug locations identification: The AST is passed to Bug Loca-
tions Identifier, that drives a bug injection profile (BIP) of all possible
injection locations in the target contract for a given security bug.
The BIP is derived using AST-based analysis for identifying po-
tential injection locations in smart contract code by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 takes as input the AST and the bug type to be injected,
and outputs the BIP.
Algorithm 1 Identifying Injection Locations Algorithm
1: procedure FindAllPotentialLocations(AST, bugType)
2: for Each form of code snippets in bugType do
3: if snippetForm == simple statement then
4: BIP ←WalkAST (simpleStatement )
5: else if snippetForm == non-function block then
6: BIP ←WalkAST (nonFunctionBlock )
7: else if snippetForm == functionDefinition then
8: BIP ←WalkAST (f unctionDef init ion)
9: end if
10: end for
11: BIP ← F indRelatedSecur ityMechanisms
12: BIP ← F indCodeThatCanBeT ransf ormed
13: return BIP
14: end procedure
To address the first challenge of identifying bug injection lo-
cations as mentioned in Section 3.2, we define rules that specify
the relation between the bug to be injected and the target contract
structure. In general, bugs take two forms: an individual statement,
and a block of statements. A block of statements can be defined
either as a stand-alone function, or a non-function block such as
an ’if’ statement. Therefore, we use a rule for each form of the bug
that defines the specifications of the locations for injecting it.
To identify such locations, for each distinct form of the code
snippets defining the bug type to be injected, we walk the AST
based on the code snippet form and the related rule (lines 2-10 in
Algorithm 1).WalkAST (simpleStatement), for example, will visit
(parse) the AST and find all the locations where a simple statement
can be injected without invalidating the compilation state of the
contract, and the same for the other forms of the code snippets
of the bug type. After identifying the locations for injecting code
snippets of bugs, we also look for existing security mechanisms to
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be weakened to introduce the related bug, and the code patterns to
be transformed for introducing the bug (lines 11 and 12).
Bug injection and code transformation: SolidiFI uses a sys-
tematic approach to inject bugs into the potential locations in the
target contract. The Bug Injector model seeds a bug for each loca-
tion specified in the BIP. It uses text-based code transformation to
modify the code where the information derived from the AST is
used to modify the code to inject bugs. Three different approaches
are used to inject bugs as discussed in Section 4.2. In addition to
injecting bugs in the target contract, Bug Injector generates a Bu-
gLog that specifies a unique identifier for each injected bug, and
the corresponding location(s) in the target contract where it has
been injected.
Buggy code check and results inspection:The resulting buggy
contract is passed to the Tool Evaluator that checks the buggy code
using the tools under evaluation. It then scans the results generated
by the tools looking for the bugs that were injected but undetected,
with the help of BugLog generated by the Bug Injector. SolidiFI only
considers the injected bugs that are undetected. So if an evalu-
ated tool reported bugs in locations other than where bugs have
been injected, SolidiFI does not consider them in its output of false
negatives. This is to avoid potential vulnerabilities in the original
contract from being reported by SolidiFI, which would skew the
results. Moreover, SolidiFI inspects results generated by the tools
looking for other reported bugs and checks if they are true bugs or
false alarms (more details in Section 7).
6 IMPLEMENTATION
SolidiFI approach is fully-automated (except for the pre-prepared
buggy snippets). This involves compiling the code, injecting and
generating buggy contracts, running the evaluated tools on the
buggy contracts, and inspecting reports of the evaluated tools for
false-negatives, mis-identified cases, and false-positives (except
for the manual validation of the filtered false-positives). To make
SolidiFI reusable, we did not hard-code the patterns that are replaced
to introduce bugs, but rather made them configurable from an
external file. We have made SolidiFI code publicly available2.
SolidiFI uses the Solidity compiler solc (supports compiler ver-
sions up to 0.5.12) to compile the source code of the smart contract
to make sure it is free from compilation errors before bugs are
injected. In addition, SolidiFI uses solc to generate the AST of the
original code in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. We have
implemented the other components of SolidiFI in Python in about
1500 lines of code. These components are responsible for identifying
the potential locations for injection, injecting bugs using a suitable
approach, generating the buggy contract, and inspecting the results
of the evaluated tools and then reporting the undetected bugs and
false alarms. Finally, we developed a Python client to interact with
contracts deployed on Ethereum network - this client is used for
assessing the exploitability of the injected bugs in the generated
buggy contracts.
7 EVALUATION
The aim of our evaluation is to measure the efficacy of SolidiFI in
evaluating smart contract static analysis tools, and finding cases of
2 https://github.com/DependableSystemsLab/SolidiFI
undetected bugs (i.e., false negatives) and false positives. We also
measure the performance of SolidiFI itself, as well as the ability to
exploit the undetected bugs. We made all the experimental artifacts
used in this study and our results publicly available3. Our evaluation
experiments are thus derived to answer the following research
questions:
• RQ1.What are the false negatives of the tools being evaluated?
• RQ2.What are the false positives of the tools being evaluated?
• RQ3. Can the injected bugs in the contracts be activated (i.e.,
exploited) at runtime by an external attacker?
• RQ4.What is the performance of SolidiFI?
As mentioned earlier, we have selected six static analysis tools
for evaluation, Oyente [Luu et al. 2016], Securify [Tsankov et al.
2018], SmartCheck [Tikhomirov et al. 2018], Mythril [Mueller 2018],
Manticore [Mossberg et al. 2019], and Slither [Feist et al. 2019]. We
downloaded these tools from their respective online repositories,
which are mentioned in the corresponding papers (Oyente 0.2.7,
Securify v1.0 as downloaded and installed in Dec 2019, Mythril
0.21.20, Smartcheck 2.0, Manticore 0.3.2.1, and Slither 0.6.9).
To perform our experiments, we used a data set of fifty smart
contracts, chosen from the list of verified smart contracts available
on Etherscan [Etherscan [n.d.]], a public repository of smart con-
tracts written in Solidity for Ethereum. We selected these contracts
based on three factors namely (1) code size (we selected contracts
with different sizes that were representative of Etherscan contracts
ranging from small contracts with tens of lines of code to large
contracts with hundreds of lines of code), (2) compatibility with
Solidity version 0.5.12 (at the time of writing, 312 out of 500 verified
smart contracts in EtherScan supported Solidity 0.5x and higher),
and (3) contracts with a wide range of functionality (e.g., tokens,
wallets, games). Table 2 shows the number of lines of code (includ-
ing comments), and number of functions and function modifiers4
for each contract. The contracts range from 39 to 741 lines of code
(loc), with an average of 242 loc.
We limited ourselves to 50 contracts due to the time and effort
needed to analyze the contracts by the evaluated tools and inspect
the analysis results of the tools to verify false-positives. With that
said, even with this dataset, SolidiFI found significant numbers of
undetected bugs in the tools (e.g., false negatives), as will be discussed
in the following sections.
As explained in Section 4, in our experiments, we injected bugs
belonging to seven different bug types within the detection scope
of the selected tools. Table 3 shows the bug types, and the tools
that are designed to detect each bug type. We chose these bug
types based on the bug types detected by the individual tools, and
because these bugs are common in smart contracts, and lead to
vulnerabilities that have been exploited in practice [Eth [n.d.]; dao
2016; bat 2018]. However, SolidiFI is not confined to these bug types.
In our experiments, we set the time-out value for each tool to
15 minutes per smart contract and bug type. If a tool’s execution
exceeds this timeout value, we terminate it and consider the bugs
found as its output. While 15 minutes may seem high, our goal is
to give each tool as much leeway as possible. Only 2 of the tools
exceeded this time limit in some cases (i.e., Mythril and Manticore).
3 https://github.com/DependableSystemsLab/SolidiFI-benchmark
4Function modifier checks a condition before the execution of the function.
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For these two tools, we experimented with larger timeout values,
but they did not significantly increase their detection coverage.
Note that the total time taken to run the experiments was already
quite high with this timeout value - for example, it took us about
4 days to analyze the contracts using Mythril (50-contract*6 bug-
types*15-minute = 75 hours).
Table 2: Contracts benchmark. F represents Functions, and
M represents Function Modifiers
Id Li
ne
s
F+
M
Id Li
ne
s
F+
M
Id Li
ne
s
F+
M
1 103 6 18 406 29 35 317 29
2 128 9 19 218 32 36 383 20
3 132 10 20 308 27 37 368 24
4 117 6 21 353 18 38 195 24
5 250 17 22 383 19 39 52 4
6 161 22 23 308 20 40 465 22
7 165 22 24 741 27 41 160 8
8 251 17 25 196 12 42 128 16
9 249 19 26 143 20 43 285 22
10 39 5 27 336 33 44 298 24
11 193 19 28 195 24 45 156 14
12 281 27 29 312 13 46 125 6
13 161 8 30 711 57 47 223 18
14 185 20 31 216 12 48 232 19
15 160 8 32 143 14 49 52 4
16 248 27 33 129 16 50 171 18
17 128 17 34 445 29
Average values 242 18
Table 3: Bug types used in our evaluation experiments: ’*’
means that the tool can detect the bug type.
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Re-entrancy * * * * * *
Timestamp dependency * * * *
Unchecked send * *
Unhandled exceptions * * * * *
TOD * *
Integer overflow/underflow * * * *
Use of tx.origin * * *
7.1 RQ1:What are the false negatives of the
tools being evaluated?
The core part of our evaluation is to use SolidiFI to inject bugs, and
evaluate the effectiveness of the tools in detecting the injected bugs.
We performed the following steps in our experiments. First, SolidiFI
is used to inject bugs of each bug type in the code of the 50 smart
contracts, one bug type at a time. The resulting buggy contracts are
then checked using the static analysis tools. Finally, the number of
the injected bugs that were not detected by each tool were recorded.
To get meaningful results, we inject bugs that are as distinct
as possible by preparing diverse set of distinct code snippets with
different data inputs and function calls- this resulted in 9369 distinct
bugs. We consider two injected bugs as distinct if the static analysis
tool under study would reason about them differently based on the
underlying methodology, where either the data and control flow
leading to the injected bug is different, or the design patterns of
the bug snippets are different. To ensure a fair evaluation, we inject
only the bugs that are supposed to be detected by each tool.
We consider an injected bug as being correctly detected by a tool
if and only if it identified both the line of code in which the bug
was injected, as well as the bug type (e.g., Re-entrancy). In many
cases, we observed that the tool would correctly identify the line
of code in which the bug occurred, but would misidentify the bug
type. Therefore, we also report the former separately.
The results of injecting bugs of each bug type, and testing them
using the six tools are summarized in Table 4. In the table, “Injected
bugs” column specifies the total number of injected bug for each
bug type, “✓” means we did not find any undetected bug of that
bug type (row), while “NA” means the bug type is out of scope of
the tool, i.e., it is not designed to detect the bug type. The numbers
for each column specify the total number of bugs that were either
incorrectly detected or not detected by the tool corresponding to
the bug type specified in that row. The number within parentheses
specifies the number of cases that were not reported by the tool -
this does not consider the incorrect reporting of the bug type.
From the table, we can see that a significant number of false
negatives occur for all the evaluated tools, and that none of the tools
was able to detect all the injected bugs correctly even if we accepted
a incorrect bug type with the correct line number as a detected bug.
In fact, the only tool that had 100% coverage for individual bug
types was Slither, for Reentrancy and tx.origin bugs. Of all tools,
Slither had the lowest false-negatives, followed by Securify across
bug types.
Our results thus show that all static analysis tools have many
corner cases of bugs that they are not able to detect. Note that it
is surprising that our technique found as many undetected bugs by
the tools as it did, given that our goal was not specifically to exercise
corner cases of the tools in question. We will discuss the reasons for
the missed detections and the implications later (Section 8).
7.2 RQ2: What are the false positives of the
tools being evaluated?
A false-positive occurs when a tool reports a bug, but there was
no bug in reality. Unlike false negatives, where we know exactly
where the bugs have been injected, and hence have ground truth,
measuring false positives is challenging due to the lack of ground
truth. This is because we cannot assume that the smart contracts
used are free of bugs (though they are chosen from the verified
contracts on Etherscan). Further, manually inspecting each bug
report and related contract involves a tremendous amount of effort
due to the large number of bug reports, and is hence not practical.
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Table 4: False negatives for each tool. Numberswithin paran-
theses are bugs with incorrect line numbers or unreported.
Security bug In
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Re-entrancy 1343
1008
(844)
232
(232)
1085
(805)
1343
(106)
1250
(1108) ✓
Timestamp dep 1381
1381
(886) NA
810
(810)
902
(341) NA
537
(1)
Unchecked-send 1266 NA
499
(449)
389
(389) NA NA NA
Unhandled exp 1374
1052
(918)
673
(571)
756
(756)
1325
(1170) NA
457
(128)
TOD 1336
1199
(1199)
263
(263) NA NA NA NA
Integer overflow 1333
898
(898) NA
1069
(932)
1072
(1072)
1196
(1127) NA
tx.origin 1336 NA NA
445
(445)
1239
(1120) NA ✓
To keep the problem of determining false-positives tractable, we
came up with the following approach. The main idea is to manually
examine only those bugs that are not reported by the majority of
the other tools for each smart contract. In other words, we conser-
vatively assume that a bug that is reported by a majority of the
tools cannot be a false positive. However, at worst, we will under-
estimate the number of false positives in this approach, subject
to the vagaries of the manual inspection process. We also verified
that many of the bugs that are excluded by the majority are indeed
false-positives by manually examining a random sample of them.
Even after this filtering, we had to manually inspect a significant
number of bugs to determine if they were false positives. There-
fore, for each tool, we randomly selected 20 bugs of each bug type
category that were not excluded by the majority approach, and
inspected them manually. For those cases where the number of
bugs is less than or equal to 20, we inspected them all. Based on the
results of our manual inspection, we estimated the false positives
as the percentage of bugs inspected that were indeed false positives,
multiplied by the number of bugs filtered (i.e., not excluded).
For example, assume that the total number of bugs reported by a
tool is 100. Of these 100 bugs, let us assume that 60 are also reported
by the majority of the other tools for the smart contract, and hence
we exclude them. Of the remaining 40 filtered bugs, we manually
examine 20 bugs chosen at random. Assume that 16 of these are
indeed false-positives. We assume that 80% of the filtered bugs are
false-positives, and estimate the number of false-positives to be 32.
The results of false positives reported by each tool are summa-
rized in Table 5. In the table, the “Threshold” column refers to the
majority threshold, which is the number of tools that must detect
the bug in order for it to be excluded from consideration - this num-
ber depends on how many tools are able to detect the bug type. For
each tool, the sub-column “Reported” shows the number of bugs re-
ported by the tool, the sub column “FIL” shows the number of bugs
that have been filtered (not excluded) by the majority approach,
while the sub column “FP” shows the false positives of the tool
based on the manual inspection as explained above. Empty cells in
the table represent cases where a tool was not designed to detect a
bug type. Note that some of the tools detected bugs outside the 7
categories that we considered - we called these as miscellaneous.
From the table, we can see that all the evaluated tools have
reported a number of false positives, ranging from 2 to 801 for
most of the bug types. Interestingly, the results show that the tools
with low numbers of false negatives reported high false positives,
i.e., Slither and Securify. For example, although Slither was the
only tool that successfully detected all the injected Re-entrancy
bugs, it reported significant false positives. This raises the question
of whether the high detection rate was simply a result of over-
zealously reporting bugs by the tool (this is also borne out by the
high number of bugs reported under the miscellaneous category by
this tool). This highlights the need for security analysis tools that are
able to detect bugs while maintaining low false positive rates.
We provide some examples of the false-positive cases below.
For example, most unhandled exception bugs were reported even
though the code checks the return values of the send functions for
exceptions using require(). As another example, many false positives
were re-entrancy bugs where the code contains the required checks
of the contract balance, and updates the contract states before the
Ether transfer. Oyente reported several cases as integer over/un-
derflow even though they are no integer related calculations (e.g.,
string public symbol = "CRE";). On the other side, we tried to be
consistent with the assumptions considered by the tools during
our manual inspection. For example, some of the cases that we
considered as true bugs were re-entrancy bugs that use the transfer
function. This function protects against re-entrancy issues as it has
limited gas; however, we considered them as true bugs as the attack
can happen if the gas price changes - this is detected by some of
the tools (e.g., Slither).
7.3 RQ3: Can the injected bugs be activated by
an external attacker?
The goal of this RQ is to assess whether the undetected bugs in
RQ1 can be activated in the contract at runtime. This is to deter-
mine whether the reason behind the bug not being detected by the
evaluated tool was because the bug cannot be activated (and hence
cannot be exploited by an attacker). We deploy the set of buggy
contracts with the undetected bugs (found in RQ1) on the Ethereum
blockchain, and execute transactions that attempt to activate them.
To conduct these experiments, we use MetaMask [Met [n.d.]], a
browser extension that allows us to connect to an Ethereum node
called INFURA [INF [n.d.]], and run our buggy contracts on this
node. We have created Ethereum accounts on Ethereum Kovan
Testnet (test network) using MetaMask, and deposited sufficient
amount of Ether to these accounts to enable us to execute transac-
tions (pay the required gas for transactions). We use Remix [rem
2017] (Solidity editor) to deploy contracts on Ethereum Kovan Test-
net. Remix enables us to connect withMetaMask to deploy contracts
on INFURA Ethereum node.
We illustrate the process with an example. As mentioned in RQ1,
Manticore did not report instances of injected integer overflow/un-
derflow bugs - an example is shown in Figure 13. Our goal is to
attempt to activate this bug in the deployed buggy contract by call-
ing the function bug_intou3(). The returned result was 246 - this is
not the expected value (-10) due to the use of unsigned integer type
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Table 5: False positives reported by each tool. Empty cells mean that the tool was not designed for that particular bug type.
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= Reported FIL FP Reported FIL FP Reported FIL FP Reported FIL FP Reported FIL FP Reported FIL FP
Re-entrancy 4 0 0 - 12 12 12 54 54 43 0 0 - 6 6 6 79 79 71
Timestamp dep 3 0 0 - 12 12 0 0 0 - 12 12 0
Unchecked send 2 7 4 4 14 3 3
Unhandled exp 3 10 10 10 0 0 - 0 0 - 6 6 6 0 0 -
TOD 2 32 24 24 121 97 97
Over/under flow 3 947 943 801 17 3 3 3 2 2 9 9 9
Use of tx.origin 2 0 0 - 3 1 0 4 2 0
Miscellaneous 0 318 144 1520 169 1807
(i.e., uint8) instead of a signed integer type, which resulted in an
integer underflow. Thus, the bug can be activated by an attacker.
We had to manually craft inputs for each bug in order to test
its activation, which takes significant effort. Because of the large
number of undetected bugs, we selected 5 undetected bugs for each
bug type randomly from different contracts to test their activation.
Table 6 shows the results of our activation experiments. In the
table “–” means we were not able to perform experiments on this
bug type, as it requires the attacker to behave as a miner, which
would consume a significant amount of computational resources.
The results show that one can exploit (activate) all the selected
bugs in their related buggy contracts. Therefore, the infeasibility of
activation of the bug was not the reason that the evaluated tools
failed to detect the injected bugs.
1 function bug_intou3 () public{
2 uint8 vundflw =0;
3 vundflw = vundflw -10; // underflow
4 return vundflw ;}
Figure 13: Undetected integer underflow bug
Table 6: Activity of Selected Undetected Bugs.
Bug type Selected bugs Activated bugs
Re-entrancy 5 5
Timestamp dependency 5 5
Unchecked send 5 5
Unhandled exceptions 5 5
TOD – –
Integer overflow/underflow 5 5
Use of tx.origin 5 5
7.4 RQ4: What is the performance of SolidiFI?
Finally, wemeasured the performance of SolidiFI in terms of the time
it takes to inject bugs and generate buggy contracts. We excluded
the time of running the tools being evaluated to check the buggy
contracts, as this is tool-specific and independent of SolidiFI. We
preformed injection of each bug type in each contract five times
and calculated the average of the five runs, and then calculated
the average of injecting the seven bug types in each contract. The
average time of injecting all instances of bug types in a contract is
25 seconds, and the worst case time was 46 seconds (for contract
24, which was the largest contract in our set). Thus, SolidiFI takes
less than 1 minute on average per contract and bug type.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine the reasons for the false negatives of
the tools observed in RQ1. We then examine the implications of
the results, and our methodology, on both tool developers and end
users. Finally, we examine some of the limitations of SolidiFI and
threats to validity of our experiments.
8.1 Reasons for False-Negatives
To establish a practical understanding of the presented results and
why some bugs were not detected, we will highlight the code snip-
pets for some of the bugs that were not detected, and then discuss
the reasons behind them. We organize this discussion by tool.
Oyente was not able to detect many instances of injected re-
entrnacy, timestamp dependency, unhandled exceptions, integer
overflow/underflow, and TOD bugs as mentioned earlier 5. Accord-
ing to the paper [Luu et al. 2016], Oyente works on detecting only
re-entrancy bugs that are based on the use of call.value. Some of the
recent tools, such as Slither, consider the detection of re-entrancy
bugs with limited gas that are based on send and transfer. Those
papers claim that send and transfer do not protect from re-entrancy
bugs in case of gas price change. Furthermore, Oyente failed to
detect instances of re-entrancy bugs that are based on the use of
call.value. One of the TOD code snippets we used in our experi-
ments is mentioned in the running example at Figure 1 on lines 9-16,
which emulates a simple game and its winner. The malicious behav-
ior occurs when the two transactions are executed in one block and
the attacker tries to change the order of the received transactions.
To understand why this bug is not detected by Oyente, in Oyente
the EVM bytecode is represented as a control flow graph (CFG).
The execution jumps are used as edges that connect the nodes of
the graph representing the basic execution blocks in the code. The
symbolic execution engine of Oyente uses the CFG to produce a
5Because the released version of Oyente did not work with the latest version of the
Solidity compiler (0.5.12), we made few changes to the injected contracts to get it to
work with Oyente - these did not impact the tool’s coverage.
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set of symbolic traces (execution paths), each associated with a
path constraint and auxiliary data, to verify pre-defined properties
(security bugs being detected). Basically, Oyente detects TOD by
comparing the different execution paths and the corresponding
data flow (Ether flow) for each path. Oyente reports those different
execution paths that have different Ether flows.
For Oyente to be able to detect all TOD bugs successfully, the
symbolic execution engine should generate all possible execution
paths for the contract to find the erroneous path - this is challenging
due to the incompleteness of symbolic execution. It also uses some
bounds that limit the symbolic execution.
Smartcheck failed to detect most of the injected bugs across
all the categories. Smartcheck checks for bugs by constructing an
Intermediate Representation (IR) from the source code, and then
using XPath patterns to search for bugs in the IR. This approach
lacks accuracy as some bugs cannot be expressed as XPath expres-
sions. For example, the re-entracy bug is difficult to express as an
XPath pattern, and is hence not detected.
Further, because Smartcheck uses XPath patterns that detect
specific syntax of some bugs, even a slight variation in the syntax
of the bug snippets would not match the XPath patterns. For in-
stance, SmartCheck did not report some occurrences of unhandled
exceptions. By checking the code snippet for one of the undetected
unhandled exception bug depicted in Figure 14, we found that
Smartcheck was not able to detect it as unchecked send because
Smartcheck only looks for send functions without an if-statement
(that checks the return value). However, in this snippet, the send
is within an if-statement even though the revert() exists in the else
clause of the if-statement, which will be triggered on the successes
of send. The same happens when other functions are used for send-
ing ether (e.g., call, etc.) instead of send. This is an inherent problem
with syntactic, rule-based tools such as Smartcheck.
1 if (!addr.send (42 ether))
2 {receivers +=1;}
3 else
4 {revert ();}}
Figure 14: Unhandled exception code snippet 1.
Mythril was the tool with the largest set of undetected bugs in
our experiments. It failed to detect many instances of re-entrancy,
timestamp dependency, unchecked send, unhandled exceptions,
integer overflow/underflow and use of tx.origin. For example, the
buggy code in Figure 15 was not detected by Mythril. The condition
of the if-statement that checks the return value of the send will
always be evaluated as true because of the added condition “| |
1==1”. Hence, the execution of the contract would be reverted in
all cases by the function revert(), regardless of whether the send
succeeds. This is incorrect as the execution should only be reverted
on the fails of send. However, Mythril does not detect this as it only
evaluates the send() part in the condition of the if-statement rather
than evaluating the whole condition with the OR part (| | 1==1).
Mythril is also very slow in term of the time it takes to analyze
contracts. Although we set the time-out for analyzing each contract
to 15 minutes, as mentioned earlier, we also tried setting the timeout
to 30 minutes and did not observe any increase in the number of
bugs demonstrating that increasing the time-out has diminishing
returns. We also found the number of undetected bugs increase in
the large contracts, as Mythril enumerates symbolic traces and this
does not scale well in large contracts.
1 if (!addr.send (10 ether) || 1==1)
2 {revert ();}
Figure 15: Unhandled exception code snippet 2.
Like the other tools, Mythril also misreported the types of many
of the injected bugs. Figure 16 shows part of a buggy contract
injected using SolidiFI. The injected contract allows users to man-
age their tokens and send tokens to each other. We injected a re-
entrancy bug using SolidiFI in the contract at lines 185-188. However,
Mythril reported the re-entrancy bug as "Unchecked Call Return
Value" (i.e., Unhandled exception) at line 186. By inspecting this
line of code, we can see that the return value of the send function is
checked and the balance is reset to zero on the success of send, so
there is no unhandled exception as reported. This calls into question
Mythril’s soundness in detecting this type of bugs as well as its
completeness in detecting Re-entrancy bugs.
177 function transfer(address _to , uint256 _value) public
returns (bool success) {
178 require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);
179 balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
180 balances[_to] += _value;
181 emit Transfer(msg.sender , _to , _value);
182 return true;
183 }
184
185 function withdraw_balances_re_ent36 () public {
186 if (msg.sender.send(balances[msg.sender ]))
187 balances[msg.sender] = 0;
188 }
Figure 16: Part of a buggy contract injected by reentrancy
bug.
Manticore was not able to detect instances of re-entrancy and
integer overflow/underflow. Unlike other evaluated tools employing
symbolic executions, we noticed that Manticore takes a long time to
analyze smart contracts, and in some cases it times-out. It consumes
significant memory space as well on our system. Moreover, Manti-
core crashed and failed to analyze most of the contracts and threw
exception errors. The 50 main contracts used in our experiments
consist of 123 analyzable contracts (each contract file may contain
more than one contract). Out of them, Manticore crashed for 83
contracts injected by re-entrancy bugs and 73 contracts injected
by integer overflow bugs. We reached out to the tool developers
to get fixes or explanation for these issues; however, there was no
response (as of the time of submission).
Securify was not able to detect several cases of injected bugs
belonging to re-entrancy, unchecked send, unhandled exceptions,
and TOD. In addition, we found many cases where Securify failed
to analyze the injected contracts and threw an error. Out of the 200
contracts injected by the four bug types (50 contracts for each bug
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type), Securify failed to analyze 5 contracts injected by unhandled
exceptions, 4 injected by re-entrancy, 4 injected by unchecked send,
and 4 injected by TOD bugs. If we excluded the injected bugs in
those contracts, the number of undetected bugs by Securify will be
as following: (re-entrancy: 105, unchecked send: 332, unhandled
exceptions: 402, and TOD: 136). Securify also reported a high num-
ber of TOD false positives compared with Oyente. A recent study
[Feng et al. 2019] found that the reported false alarms by Securify
are due to over-approximation of the execution.
Slither Although Slither has almost 100% accuracy in detecting
re-entrancy, timestamp, and tx.origin bugs, it was not able to detect
many instances of unhandled exceptions. Moreover, it had high
number of re-entrancy false positives as mentioned earlier.
8.2 Implications
Tool Developers There are two implications for tool developers.
The first implication is that using pattern matching for detecting
bugs, especially by employing simple approaches such as XPaths
matching, is not an effective way for detecting smart contract bugs
for the reasons mentioned earlier in this section. The second point
is that bug detection approaches that are based on enumerating
symbolic traces are impeded by path explosion and scalability is-
sues. Therefore, there is a need for sophisticated analysis tools
that also consider the semantics of the analyzed code instead of
depending only on analyzing the syntax and symbolic traces. For
example, static analysis might work better if combined with for-
mal methods that consider the semantic specifications of Solidity
and EVM. Recent papers [Amani et al. 2018; Bhargavan et al. 2016;
Grishchenko et al. 2018; Hildenbrandt et al. 2017; Hirai 2017] have
proposed semi-automated formal verification for performing anal-
ysis of smart contracts.
End Users of Tools: For smart contract developers, who are the
end users of the static analysis tools, there are three implications.
First, they can use SolidiFI to assess the efficacy of static analysis
tools to choose the most reliable tools with no or low false negatives
for their use cases. Second, developers should not rely exclusively
on static analysis tools, and should test the developed contracts
extensively. SolidiFI can help them build test suites by introducing
mutations and checking if the test cases can catch them. Finally,
the generated bugs by SolidiFI and their relative locations in the
code can be used for educating developers on writing secure code.
8.3 Limitations of SolidiFI
There are two limitations of SolidiFI. First, the current version of So-
lidiFI works only on Solidity static analysis tools. Although Solidity
is the most common language for writing Ethereum smart contracts
and most of the proposed tools target analysis of Solidity contracts,
SolidiFI functionality can be easily extended to other languages.
Secondly, the bug injection approach employed by SolidiFI requires
pre-prepared code snippets (for each bug type), which requires
some manual effort. However, this is a one-time cost for each bug
type (we have provided these as part of the tool).
8.4 Threats to Validity
An external threat to the validity is the limited number of smart
contracts considered, namely 50. We have mitigated this threat by
considering a wide-range of smart contracts with varying function-
ality and code sizes. We emphasize that SolidiFI covers all syntactic
elements of Solidity up to version 0.5.12 and, our data-set contains
a wide variety of contracts with different features (e.g., loops). Also,
we selected contracts with different sizes that were representative
of EtherScan contracts ranging from 39 to 741 locs, with an average
of 242 loc (Table 2).
There are two internal threats to validity. First, the number of
tools considered is limited to 6. However, as mentioned, these rep-
resent the common tools used in other studies on smart contract
static analysis. Further, they are widely used in both academia
and industry. All the tools available are open-source and are being
actively maintained (with the exception of Oyente). Further, the
implemented prototype of SolidiFI is reusable and can be easily
extended to evaluate other tools. The second internal threat to va-
lidity is that we only injected 7 bug types. However, these bug types
have been (1) considered by most of the tools evaluated, and (2)
exploited in the past by real attacks. Therefore, we believe they are
representative of security bugs in smart contracts.
Finally, a construct threat to validity is our measurement of false-
negatives and false-positives. For false-negatives, it is possible that
the bugs cannot be exploited in practice.We have partially mitigated
this threat by sampling the set of false-negatives and attempting
to exploit them (RQ3). For false-positives, it is possible that the
reported bugs are true positives. Again, we have partially mitigated
this threat by conservatively considering the bugs reported by the
majority of the tools for each bug category as true positives.
9 RELATEDWORK
Bug-finding Tools Evaluation The approach of injecting bugs
for evaluating the effectiveness of bug finders has been applied in
other contexts than smart contracts. Bonett et al. proposed µSE
[Bonett et al. 2018], a mutation-based framework for the evalua-
tion of Android static analysis tools that works as follows. First, a
fixed set of security operators are created describing the unwanted
behavior that the tools being evaluated aim to detect (e.g., data
leakage). Then, µSE inserts the security operators into mobile apps
based on mutation schemes, that consider Android abstractions,
tools reachability and security goals of the tools, thereby creating
multiple mutants that represent unwanted behavior within the
apps. The mutated apps are analyzed using the static tools to be
evaluated. However, unlike our work, the undetected mutants are
analyzed manually. Further, their framework focuses only on data
leak detection tools, unlike our work, which is more general.
Pewny et al. [Pewny and Holz 2016] automatically find potential
vulnerable locations in C code, and modify the source code to make
it vulnerable. Program analysis techniques are used to find sinks
in the programs matching specific bug patterns, and find connec-
tions to user-controlled sources through data-flow. The program
is modified accordingly to make it exploitable. In contrast to our
approach, the vulnerable code locations to be injected are randomly
chosen, and the implemented prototype targets the injection of
spatial memory errors through the modification of security checks.
Dolan-Gavitt et al. [Dolan-Gavitt et al. 2016] proposed LAVA for
generating and injecting bugs into the source code of programs
using dynamic taint analysis. A guard is inserted for every injected
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bug for triggering the vulnerability if a specific value occurs in
the input. Specifically, LAVA identifies an execution trace location
where an unmodified and dead input data byte (DUA) is available.
Then code is added at this location to make the DUA byte available,
and use it execute the vulnerability. Unlike our work, the injection
is based on dynamic taint analysis, and the injected bugs are accom-
panied by triggering inputs. In contrast, our goal is to transform
invulnerable code to systematically introduce vulnerabilities in it.
In recent work, Akca et al. [Akca et al. 2019] proposed a tool that
the authors used to compare the effectiveness of their introduced
smart contracts static analyzer with some other tools. by injecting a
single bug into the contract code. Unlike our approach that injects
exploitable bugs into all potential locations in the contract code,
the tool uses Fault Seeder [Peng et al. 2019] to generate contract
mutants by injecting only a single bug snippet (hard-coded in the
source code) into a specific location in the smart contract. In addi-
tion, the authors conducted manual inspection of the tool reports to
determine false negatives. Injecting a single bug does not provide a
comprehensive coverage evaluation of static analysis tools. Also, it
is not clear how to evaluate the efficacy of static analysis tools on
detecting deep vulnerabilities and corner cases by injecting only
a single bug. As presented before, each bug can be introduced in
the code in several ways, in this case, injecting a single-bug will
not test the efficacy of the static analysis tools to detect various
variants of each bug.
Durieux et al. [Durieux et al. 2019] compared a number of smart
contract static analysis tools. Unlike our work, the evaluation is
based on using 69 manually annotated smart contracts with 112
bugs in total. The vulnerable contracts are collected from online
repositories that are not agnostic of the evaluated tools, hence, re-
sults might be biased (e.g., collecting 50% of the contracts from SWC
Registry referenced by Mythril and maintained by the team behind
it). In contrast, our goal is to perform systematic and comprehen-
sive coverage evaluation of static analysis tools by transforming
invulnerable code to systematically introduce vulnerabilities into
all valid locations. We evaluated 6 tools on detecting about 9369
distinct bugs. To provide a fair evaluation of the tools, we evalu-
ate each tool only on the bugs that it is designed to detect. Our
proposed approach can be easily used to evaluate smart contract
static analysis tools for detecting other bug types. Further, it enables
end-users to choose any dataset of smart contracts for evaluating
the tools.
Smart Contract Testing and Exploitation: There have been
many recent papers on testing smart contracts, and automatically
generating security exploits on them. Wu et al. [Wu et al. 2019]
produce test cases by mutating specific patterns in smart contracts.
Chan et al. [Chan and Jiang 2018] develop a fuzz testing service
(Fuse) to support the fuzz testing of smart contracts. This is a work
in progress report, and only presents the architecture of the fuzz
service being developed. Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2019] target the
generation of test suites for smart contracts. This work guides
automatic generation of test cases for Ethereum smart contracts.
Eth-mutants [eth [n.d.]] is another mutation testing tool for smart
contracts. However, it is limited to replacing < to ≤, and > to ≥
(and vice versa). Unlike our focus on evaluating smart contracts’
static analysis tools, these papers target the generation of test cases
for the smart contracts.
Other papers focus on automatic exploitation of smart contracts
to generate exploits or malicious inputs to exploit found code vul-
nerabilities [Feng et al. 2019; Jiang et al. 2018; Krupp and Rossow
2018]. teEther [Krupp and Rossow 2018] generates exploits for vul-
nerable contracts using symbolic execution with the Z3 constraint
solver [DeMoura and Bjørner 2008] to solve path constraints for the
critical paths in the control flow graph. Contractfuzzer [Jiang et al.
2018] uses the Application Binary Interface (ABI) specifications of
vulnerable smart contracts to generate exploits (fuzzing inputs) for
two vulnerabilities. SMARTSCOPY [Feng et al. 2019] also synthe-
sizes adversarial contracts for exploiting vulnerabilities in contracts
based on ABI specifications of the contracts covering larger set of
vulnerabilities than Contractfuzzer. Echidna [Crytic [n.d.]] has been
proposed for fuzzing smart contracts. It supports grammar-based
fuzzing to generate transactions to test smart contracts. The goal
of these techniques is testing the smart contracts themselves for
security vulnerabilities rather than testing bug-finding tools.
10 CONCLUSION
This paper proposed SolidiFI, a technique for performing system-
atic evaluation of Ethereum smart contract’s static analysis tools
based on bug injection. SolidiFI analyzes the AST (Abstract Syntax
Tree) of smart-contracts and injects pre-defined bug patterns at
all possible locations in the AST. SolidiFI was used to evaluate 6
smart contract static analysis tools, and the evaluation results show
several cases of bugs that were not detected by the evaluated tools
even though those undetected bugs are within the detection scope
of tools. SolidiFI thus identifies important gaps in current static
analysis tools for smart contracts, and provides a reproducible set
of tests for developers of future static analysis tools. It also allows
smart contract developers to understand the limitations of existing
static analysis tools with respect to detecting security bugs.
Future work will consist of expanding SolidiFI to other smart
contract languages than Solidity, and automating the bug definition
processes for injecting new bug types.
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